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Abstract Counterfactual thought allows people to consider
alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating
these thoughts through language poses a social-
communicative challenge because listeners typically expect
a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per
definition convey information that is false. Listeners must
therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood,
such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the
intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study fo-
cused on the comprehension of such counterfactual anteced-
ents and investigated if pragmatic ability—the ability to apply
knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in
daily life—predicts the online generation of counterfactual
worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are
consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing
cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual
antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets
were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that
counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language
comprehension and reduces online expectations based on fac-
tual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient
Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting
that individuals who are better at understanding the commu-
nicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce
knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These re-
sults are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic
processes involved in creating possible worlds.
Keywords Counterfactuals . Pragmatics . Event-related
potentials . N400 . Autistic traits
Counterfactual Bwhat-if^ thought enables people to go beyond
the here and now and into possible and impossible worlds.
This ability to imagine alternative realities plays an important
role in cognition and emotion (Byrne, 2016; Rips & Edwards,
2013; Spellman & Mandel, 1999). Thinking about alternative
sequences of events helps people to infer causality and adapt
their future behaviour accordingly. Experiencing counterfac-
tual emotions, such as regret or relief, contributes to an under-
standing of personal control and responsibility (Epstude &
Roese, 2008; Frith, 2013). Although humans routinely and
spontaneously engage in counterfactual thought, communicat-
ing these thoughts via language poses a social-communicative
challenge: Human communication is effective because
speakers typically say things that are true (Grice, 1975), but
counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false.
Counterfactual antecedents therefore contain overt linguistic
cues (e.g., If I loved you then) that guide listeners towards the
intended meaning. Language comprehension requires rapid
incorporation of such cues into the unfolding interpretation
in order to avoid misunderstanding. This implies an important
link between social cognition and online counterfactual language
comprehension. To investigate this link, the current study used
event-related brain potentials (ERP) to test whether the pragmatic
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ability to interpret others’ communicative intentions impacts the
online comprehension of counterfactual antecedents.
Social cognition and counterfactual language
Understanding the intentions of other people is a crucial ele-
ment of social cognition and involves the attribution of mental
states known as theory of mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen, Leslie,
& Frith, 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In clinical and
developmental research, ToM reasoning has long been asso-
ciated with counterfactual thought (Scott, Baron‐Cohen, &
Leslie, 1999; Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004), perhaps
because ToM and counterfactuals both involve two represen-
tations of incompatible information (two different perspec-
tives in ToM reasoning, false and true in counterfactual rea-
soning). Developmental studies show that children who are
better at counterfactual reasoning are also better at the false
belief task, a standard measure of ToM capacity (Peterson &
Bowler, 2000; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Neuroimaging studies with adult
participants show that counterfactual reasoning and ToM rea-
soning draw upon overlapping brain regions (Van Hoeck
et al., 2014). Moreover, children with autism, a developmental
disorder characterized by both pragmatic and ToM deficits
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), exhibit impairments in counter-
factual reasoning (Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004; Leevers &
Harris, 2000) despite performing well on other types of rea-
soning tasks (McKenzie, Evans, & Handley, 2010; Scott &
Baron-Cohen, 1996). Impaired counterfactual reasoning in
children with autism may therefore reflect a pragmatic deficit.
Just as children with autism miss the social purpose of pre-
tence play (Leslie, 1992), they may not understand the com-
municative intention to temporarily accept a false proposition
as true in order to reason about it (e.g., Leevers & Harris,
2000; Surian, Baron-Cohen, & Van der Lely, 1996; see also
Baron-Cohen, 2008). Such pragmatic deficit could impede the
successful set-up of a counterfactual possible world (If ele-
phants had wings…), subsequently interfering with counter-
factual reasoning (… then they could fly). Although the exact
relationship between pragmatic skills and ToM is not clear
(Cummings, 2013; Tager-Flusberg, 2000), these abilities
show robust positive correlations and are possibly supported
by a common neural system (Martin & McDonald, 2003).
Taken together, developmental, clinical, and neuroimaging
findings suggest a close relationship between pragmatic skills
and counterfactual reasoning.
This relationship may have repercussions for online coun-
terfactual language comprehension. Because literal and overt
meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning (Sperber
& Wilson, 2002), understanding the meaning of what other
people say heavily relies on inferences about people’s inten-
tions. These pragmatic inferences are based on the cooperative
principles of communication (Levinson, 1983; Van Linden &
Verstraete, 2008) and must be generated in a rapid and incre-
mental manner to avoid delays in comprehension. The most
important cooperative principle is to be truthful, to say what
you mean and not say what you do not mean (Grice, 1975).
Counterfactuals are pragmatically challenging because they
also convey informat ion that is fac tual ly fa lse .
Counterfactual comprehension therefore critically relies on
successful comprehension of the subjunctive mood (e.g., If
Mary had tossed tails, she would have won). Subjunctive
mood is the linguistic cue that the speaker knows that what
he or she is saying is factually not true (Stalnaker, 1975) and
expects the hearer to know the same. Subjunctive mood can be
contrasted with indicative mood (If Mary tossed tails, she
won), which is used to convey purely hypothetical conditional
relations and does not restrict the truth-value of the expressed
proposition (Byrne, 2002; Stewart, Haigh, & Kidd, 2009).
In the current study, we tested the hypothesis that pragmatic
skills impact the online comprehension of counterfactual an-
tecedents. We contrasted comprehension of subjunctive and
indicative mood, which use the same If-construction and
therefore allows for a well-matched investigation of
counterfactuality (Kulakova, Aichhorn, Schurz, Kronbichler,
& Perner, 2013). Our participants read counterfactual or hy-
pothetical antecedents, such as If sweets were/are made out of
sugar, while their electrical brain activity was measured.
Following recent ERP studies on pragmatic language compre-
hension (Ferguson, Cane, Douchkov, & Wright, 2015;
Ferguson & Cane, 2015; Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg,
2010; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Van den Brink et al.,
2012), our dependent measure was the N400 ERP (Kutas &
Hillyard, 1980), an ERP component that reflects the impact of
online semantic expectations during language comprehension.
Before outlining our ERP predictions, we discuss the rationale
of our study.
The N400 ERP and online pragmatic comprehension
Our dependent measure, the N400, is a negative-going deflec-
tion that peaks over centro-parietal electrodes around 400 ms
after word onset (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) and that is elicited
by every content word of an unfolding sentence. N400 ampli-
tude decreases when retrieval of word-associated information
in semantic memory is facilitated by the context, potentially
via knowledge-based predictions (e.g., Ito, Corley, Pickering,
Martin, & Nieuwland, 2016; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011).
Such predictions are also reflected in ‘sentence truth-value
N400-effects’, when words that render a sentence true and
plausible elicit a smaller N400 than words that render a sen-
tence false or implausible (Nieuwland, 2015, 2016;
Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). Such effects seem not to
directly reflect the online computation on truth-value, but to
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reflect people’s use of real-world knowledge as well as
pragmatic knowledge to generate expectancies about
upcoming words. This follows from observations that N400
amplitude is not a direct function of propositional plausibility
or truth-value, but instead a function to what extent the
incoming word shares semantic features with information that
people may be expecting to appear (e.g., Ito et al., 2016; Kutas
& Federmeier, 2011). When an incoming word is consistent
with these knowledge-based predictions, the semantic retrieval
of relevant information is facilitated, leading to smaller N400s
compared to words that are inconsistent with world knowledge
(Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Nieuwland,
2013, 2015, 2016; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Nieuwland
& Martin, 2012).
Context-based facilitation of semantic processing can oc-
cur regardless of whether the described context is factual or
counterfactual (Ferguson, Scheepers, & Sanford, 2010;
Ferguson & Cane, 2015; Nieuwland, 2013; Nieuwland &
Martin, 2012). Furthermore, facilitating contextual informa-
tion is not restricted to the literal meaning of words.
Pragmatic cues such as communicative conventions or
social-context information can be rapidly incorporated in the
interpretation of the unfolding message, facilitating consistent
continuations (Nieuwland et al., 2010; Nieuwland &
Kuperberg, 2008). However, such pragmatic facilitation may
depend on participants’ individual sensitivity to or use of
available pragmatic cues. For instance, in an ERP study on
comprehension of some-sentences, the N400 increase for
underinformative sentences, such as Some people have lungs,
was positively correlated with pragmatic skills (Nieuwland
et al., 2010). Similar effects have been observed for individual
differences in empathy, a ToM component engaged in identi-
fying and responding to others’ emotions (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004). Van den Brink et al. (2012) found that
higher empathy quotient scores are associated with larger
N400s in response to inconsistencies between message con-
tent and speaker identity, suggesting that empathy was asso-
ciated with knowledge-based predictions from pragmatic
cues, in this case, the speaker’s voice. In a recent study
(Ferguson et al., 2015), empathy quotient scores were also
associatedwith false belief reasoning during story comprehen-
sion, evidenced by larger N400s to words that suggested that a
protagonist acted on information they could not possess.
Taken together, the available ERP studies on pragmatic com-
prehension suggest that individual differences in pragmatic
abilities can predict people’s use of pragmatic knowledge to
generate expectations about upcoming information.
In ERP research on counterfactual language comprehen-
sion, all studies so far have examined the impact of a counter-
factual antecedent on the comprehension of a factually false
consequent (Ferguson & Cane, 2015; Ferguson, Sanford, &
Leuthold, 2008; Kulakova, Freunberger, & Roehm, 2014;
Nieuwland 2013; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012; Urrutia, de
Vega, & Bastiaansen, 2012). While such a manipulation taps
into important component of conditional reasoning, it does not
capture the most characteristic feature of counterfactuality: the
creation of the if-antecedent that is factually false but tempo-
rarily accepted as true. This process of creating counterfactual
worlds remains poorly studied despite being a fundamental
step towards conditional reasoning. It requires the rapid incor-
poration of subjunctive mood so that the comprehender can
adjust his or her knowledge-based expectations. By marking
the antecedent as counterfactual, subjunctive mood facilitates
counterfactual continuations, possibly by lowering expecta-
tions of factually true continuations (Stewart et al., 2009; for
a review, see Kulakova &Nieuwland, 2016). This lowering of
expectations should lead to a larger N400 for a word that is
consistent with real-world knowledge while not increasing the
expectation of words that are both false and unrelated to the
context (for a discussion, see Nieuwland, 2016). Moreover, if
pragmatic skills determine the successful incorporation of
subjunctive mood, pragmatic skills should correlate with
comprehenders’ readiness to lower their expectations from
real-world knowledge.
The present study
In the present study, we tested whether pragmatically skilled
participants were more likely to use the pragmatic cue of sub-
junctive mood in the counterfactual antecedent in order to set
up a counterfactual interpretation. We recorded participants’
EEG while they read counterfactual and hypothetical condi-
tional sentences with antecedents that conveyed information
that was either false or true with respect to factual world knowl-
edge.1 Counterfactual false antecedents (If words were made
out of sugar) were phrased in subjunctive mood and expressed
a state of affairs which is false with respect to world knowledge.
In contrast, counterfactual true conditions (If sweets were made
out of sugar) conveyed factually true knowledge and therefore
violated the pragmatic cue of counterfactuality signalled by
subjunctive mood. Hypothetical conditionals in both truth-
value conditions were phrased in indicative mood (If words/
sweets are made out of sugar) and served as a comparison
condition with pragmatically unrestricted truth-values.
Declarative sentences (As words/sweets are made out of sugar)
were included as a nonconditional control condition. By mea-
suring participant’s self-reported pragmatic skills (the Autism
Quotient Communication subscale; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), we
1 The labels true and false are not meant to suggest that counterfactual or
hypothetical antecedents themselves (If words were/are made out of sug-
ar,…) have a clear truth-value. Rather, following a logical-philosophical
tradition (e.g., Lewis 1973), antecedent truth-value labels are derived
from the truth-values of corresponding declarative propositions (Words
are made out of sugar).
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investigated whether differences in social-communicative abil-
ities can predict the generation of pragmatic expectations dur-
ing conditional antecedent processing. We expected that partic-
ipants would rapidly incorporate the pragmatic cue of
counterfactuality and decrease the expectation of real-world
consistent words, leading to larger N400s to counterfactual true
antecedents compared to hypothetical true antecedents. In ad-
dition, we predicted that this counterfactual-pragmatic N400
effect would increase with the pragmatic skills of the partici-
pant. No effect of mood was expected for false antecedents,
because counterfactual antecedents were not designed to in-
crease the predictability of the factually false continuation (If
words were/are made out of sugar).
Method
Participants
Thirty right-handed University of Edinburgh students (19
women, mean age = 22 years, SD = 4 years) gave written
consent to participate in the study. All were native English
speakers without neurological or psychiatric disorders and
were paid for their participation. The study was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was ap-
proved by the University of Edinburgh Ethics Committee.
Materials and design
We constructed 90 sentences about various world-knowledge
topics with which native English-speaking Edinburgh
University students were expected to be familiar. Each sen-
tence could be phrased as counterfactuals (subjunctive mood)
or hypotheticals (indicative mood) and have an antecedent
either true or false in respect to factual world knowledge
(see Table 1 for example stimuli). In addition to these exper-
imental conditions, stimuli could be phrased as factual declar-
ative phrases. These were identical to the indicative condi-
tionals except that they started with As instead of If. In both
experimental and declarative conditions, the second word of
the first clause manipulated real-world truth-value and could
be either consistent (sweets) or inconsistent (words) with the
critical word (sugar), resulting in factually true or false initial
clauses, respectively. The critical words were identical across
all conditions and always took the final position of the first
clause, with the distance between critical word and the noun
which manipulated truth-value kept constant with four words.
The experimental antecedents were followed by consequents
that completed the conditional in a relatively plausible manner
(B… sentences/candy can/could make people very fat when
consumed frequently). The complete stimulus list can be
found in the Supplementary Material.
Semantic similarity or lexical-semantic association values
were calculated between critical antecedent-final words and
the preceding clause using latent semantic analysis
(Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). Mean LSA values in true
conditions were significantly higher than in false conditions
(0.25 (0.08) vs. 0.15 (0.11); t(89) = 9.12, p < .001).
It is important to note that the counterfactual antecedents
were not designed to guide participants towards the expecta-
tion of one particular false continuation. To establish the effect
of predictability of critical words, we collected cloze ratings
from 81 student participants (59 females, mean age 19 years,
SD = 2 years) using an online survey. Subjects completed one
of six counterbalanced lists with the first clause of the
sentences truncated before the critical word. Cloze value was
computed as the percentage of participants who used the
intended critical word (Taylor, 1953). In the experimental
stimuli a 2 (truth-value: true, false) × 2 (mood: counterfactual,
hypothetical) repeated-measures ANOVA (by items) showed
that cloze values only differed between true (mean cloze value
of counterfactual-true: .30; hypothetical-true: .31) and false
(counterfactual-false: .04; hypothetical-false: .02) clauses,
F(1, 89) = 125.75, p < .001, but not between mood, F(1, 89)
< 1. In declarative sentences, continuations that rendered the
first clause true were more predictable than false continuations
(.41 vs. .01), F(1, 89) = 167.44, p < .001. However, it is
possible that cloze rating participants ignored the factor of
mood and used the first word that came to their mind regard-
less of whether it made counterfactual sense. We therefore
Table 1 Example stimuli of experimental conditional (counterfactual
and hypothetical) and declarative control clauses
Condition Example stimuli
Counterfactual-true If sweets were made out of sugar,
If light was perceived with the eyes,
If flutes were used to make music,
Counterfactual-false If words were made out of sugar,
If sound was perceived with the eyes,
If vegetables were used to make music,
Hypothetical-true If sweets are made out of sugar,
If light is perceived with the eyes,
If flutes are used to make music,
Hypothetical-false If words are made out of sugar,
If sound is perceived with the eyes,
If vegetables are used to make music,
Declarative-true As sweets are made out of sugar,
As light is perceived with the eyes,
As flutes are used to make music,
Declarative-false As words are made out of sugar,
As sound is perceived with the eyes,
As vegetables are used to make music,
Note. Critical words are underlined for expository purposes only.
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2016) 16:814–824 817
report cloze values but do not refer to these values to explain
the observed N400 effects. Importantly, if taken at face value,
cloze values do not offer a simple alternative explanation to
our online findings.
For the EEG experiment, six presentation lists were created.
Each participant saw two conditions of each of the 90 stimuli
but never in the same context that manipulated truth-value. Each
subject therefore read 30 items per condition (four conditional-
experimental conditions, two declarative control conditions).
The sentences were pseudorandomized and interspersed with
64 plausible declarative filler sentences (e.g., To mail a letter
you have to put it in the postbox). Each subject read a total of
244 sentences, which took approximately 50 minutes.
Procedure
Participants silently read sentences from a monitor (black let-
ters, light-grey background), presented word-by-word at a
regular pace (300 ms word duration, 200 ms interword inter-
val) with antecedent-final and sentence-final words presented
for 600 ms. Antecedent-final critical words were presented
with a comma and sentence-final words with a period. Each
sentence was followed by a fixation cross upon which partic-
ipants started the next sentence by button-press in a self-paced
manner. Five practice trials at the beginning of the experiment
familiarised participants with the procedure and presentation
pace. There was no task except reading for comprehension.
After the ERP experiment, participants filled out the
Communication subscale of the Autism Spectrum
Questionnaire (AQ-Comm; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which
as been employed in previous ERP investigations of pragmat-
ic language processing (Nieuwland et al., 2010). The scale
comprises 10 items that assess subjects’ communication abil-
ities, especially involving the communicative use of language
in a social context (e.g., BI find it easy to ‘read between the
lines’ when someone is talking to me,^ or BI am often the last
to understand the point of a joke^). The AQ-Comm scale
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating stronger
presence of a pragmatic deficit, a trait associated with autism
spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, 1988). The subscale has
strong discriminative validity, yielding scores that differ sig-
nificantly between individuals with autism and typically de-
veloping individuals (Broadbent et al., 2013).
EEG data collection
The EEG was recorded at a sampling rate of 512 Hz using a
BioSemi ActiveTwo system (http://www.biosemi.com) with 64
EEG electrodes in an International 10–20 electrode configura-
tion (see Fig. 1), two additional mastoid electrodes, and four
EOG electrodes (left and right horizontal cantus and above/
below the right eye), referenced to the common mode sense
(CMS; active electrode) and grounded to a passive electrode.
The system’s hardware is completely DC-coupled and applies
digital low-pass filtering through its ADC’s decimation filter
(the hardware bandwidth limit). This has a fifth-order sync re-
sponse with a 3 dB point at one-fifth of the sample rate (i.e.,
approximating a low-pass filter at 100 Hz). The EEG was
rereferenced to the average of the left and right mastoid elec-
trode offline and filtered (0.1–20 Hz bandwidth filter with 12-
dB slope plus 50-Hz Notch filter). The data were then segment-
ed into epochs that started 500ms before critical word onset and
lasted 1,000 ms after word onset and corrected for ocular arte-
facts using the Grattons and Coles method implemented in
BrainVision Analyzer (Brain Products). All epochs were nor-
malized to a 200-ms prestimulus baseline and then semiauto-
matically screened for artefacts. Seven participants were exclud-
ed because of excessive artefacts. Cut-off was 21 artefact-free
epochs within each experimental condition, which equals a trial
loss of <30 %. For the remaining 23 participants,2 individual
average ERPs were computed over artefact-free trials (average
trial loss 11.7 %) for critical words of each condition.
Fig. 1 Electrode configuration and the region of interest (ROI) clusters
used for statistical analyses. AL = anterior left, AR = anterior right, PL =
posterior left, PR = posterior right, MA = midline anterior, MP = midline
posterior
2 We decided against additional data collection based on a power analysis
(G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) establishing the
required sample size to detect a significant strong correlation effect (r =
.50) between individual pragmatic skills and N400 amplitude based on
comparable previous findings (Ferguson et al., 2015; Nieuwland et al.,
2010). With the recommended settings of alpha = .05 and power = .80
(Cohen, 1992), a sample size ofN = 23 is sufficient to detect the expected
effect.
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Statistical analysis
Using average amplitude per condition across electrodes, 2
(truth-value: true, false) × 2 (mood: counterfactual, hypothet-
ical) repeated-measures ANOVAwere performed in the time
window of 350–500 ms, which corresponds to the N400-ef-
fect. Scalp distributions of the effects were examined using
electrode grouping into regions of interest (ROIs; see Fig. 1).
Separate analyses were performed for lateral ROIs (AL, AR,
PL, PR) using a 2 (truth) × 2 (mood) × 2 (hemisphere: left,
right) × 2 (anteriority: anterior, posterior) ANOVA and mid-
line ROIs (MA, MP) using a 2 (truth) × 2 (mood) × 2
(anteriority: anterior, posterior) ANOVA.
Results
N400-effects of linguistic mood and real-world truth-value
Critical words that rendered an antecedent factually false elic-
ited larger (more negative) N400s compared to words render-
ing an antecedent true (see Fig. 2; a figure showing all
electrodes is provided in the Supplementary Material). This
was supported by a main effect of truth-value, mean difference
1.16 μV; F(1, 22) = 14.10, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39, in the lateral
ROI ANOVA. Furthermore, counterfactual antecedents elicit-
ed larger N400s than hypothetical antecedents, reflected in a
main effect of mood, mean difference 0.72 μV; F(1, 22) =
8.44, p < .01, ηp
2 = .28. Critically, however, we also observed
a robust truth by mood by hemisphere interaction, F(1, 22) =
13.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39. Based on the prediction that mood
effects should be restricted to true clauses, we resolved this
interaction by truth-value, which has the additional advantage
of comparing critical words that are equally semantically related
to the preceding context. This revealed a significant mood by
hemisphere interaction in the true, F(1, 22) = 6.81, p < .05, and
a weaker interaction effect in the false condition, F(1, 22) = 4.39,
p < .05. Further resolving both interaction effects showed that
true counterfactual clauses elicited significantly larger N400s
compared to true hypothetical clauses in the right, mean differ-
ence 1.24 μV; t(22) = 3.15, p < .01, but not the left hemisphere,
mean difference 0.70 μV; t(22) = 1.89, p = .07. In false condi-
tions, counterfactual and hypothetical clauses did neither differ in
the right, mean difference 0.26 μV; t(22) < 1, nor in the left
hemisphere, mean difference 0.68 μV; t(22) = 1.42, p = .17.
Finally, all false sentences elicited stronger N400s than did true
sentences in posterior, mean difference 1.57 μV; t(22) = 4.39,
p < .001, compared to anterior electrodes, mean difference
Fig. 2 ERP results of counterfactual and hypothetical clauses. Left side:
Grand average waveforms timelocked to critical word onset for each of
the four experimental conditions. Right side middle: Scalp distributions
of the mean difference for counterfactual-true minus hypothetical-true
(i.e., the mood difference in true conditions) and for false minus true
(i.e., the main effect of truth-value). Right side bottom: Correlation of
the Autism Questionnaire Communication score (AQ-Comm) with the
voltage difference between true conditions (left) and between false
conditions (right) elicited over right hemisphere electrodes. (Color
figure online)
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0.75 μV; t(22) = 2.28, p < .05, resulting in a significant truth by
anteriority interaction, F(1, 22) = 7.46, p < .05.
The midline repeated-measures ANOVA revealed similar
effects. Words that rendered clauses false elicited stronger
N400s compared to true continuations, mean difference
1.18 μV; F(1, 22) = 13.43, p < .001. Counterfactual clauses
elicited stronger N400s compared to hypothetical clauses,
mean difference 0.72 μV; F(1, 22) = 5.16, p < .05. The
N400s elicited by false clauses were stronger in posterior, mean
difference 1.65μV; t(22) = 4.30, p < .001, compared to anterior
electrodes, mean difference 0.72 μV; t(22) = 1.99, p = .06,
indicated by a truth by anteriority interaction, F(1, 22) = 6.36,
p < .05.
AQ-Comm correlation analysis
For this analysis, we first calculated an individual N400-effect
score as the difference between the amplitudes of
counterfactual-true and hypothetical-true conditions in the right
hemisphere where this effect was most pronounced. This dif-
ference constitutes a score for the individual sensitivity to the
pragmatic violation of counterfactuality, with more negative
values indicating stronger sensitivity. A correlation analysis
showed that individual pragmatic proficiency (AQ-Comm
score; M = 2.35, SD = 1.76; range 0–7) was significantly cor-
related with the individual size of the pragmatic N400-effect,
r(21) =.55, p < .001, 95 % CIs [.20, .81]. This indicates that
pragmatically skilled subjects (with low AQ-Comm scores)
showed stronger pragmatic N400 effects compared to subjects
with low pragmatic skills (high AQ-Comm scores). No such
effect was observed for the difference between mood in the
factually false conditions, r(21) = -.03, p = .93.
Declarative control sentences
Analyses of the declarative control sentences revealed that
words that rendered clauses false elicited larger N400s com-
pared to words that rendered clauses true (mean difference
1.82 μV). A 2 (truth-value) × 2 (anteriority) × 2 (hemisphere)
repeated-measures ANOVA showed the corresponding main
effect of truth-value,F(1, 22) = 15.89, p < .001. A similar effect
of truth-value was present in the midline ANOVA, mean dif-
ference 2.42 μV; F(1, 22) = 17.74, p < .001.
The semantic N400-effect was not significantly correlated
with individual AQ-Comm score in the right hemisphere,
r(21) = .26, p = .23, although the slope of the correlation
was in the same direction as the statistically significant corre-
lation between the pragmatic N400-effect and the AQ-Comm
score (see Fig. 3). A direct comparison of the correlation co-
efficients showed a marginal but not significant difference,
tdiff(20) = 1.15, p = .13 (Chen & Popovich, 2002), suggesting
that the association between pragmatic skills and the pragmat-
ic N400 effect cannot be confidently concluded to be larger
than the association between pragmatic skills and the effect of
world knowledge in declarative clauses. The similar direction
and magnitude of both correlations suggests the possibility
that the individual N400 mood-effect was (partly) driven by
a general sensitivity to world knowledge violations. To test
this possibility, we computed the partial correlation between
AQ-Comm and the pragmatic N400-effect while controlling
for individual variation of the semantic N400-effect. The cor-
relation remained stable and statistically significant, r(20) =
.54, p < .01, 95 % CIs [.22, .75], which suggests that the
relationship between pragmatic skills and the online effect of
counterfactuality cannot be accounted for by a general sensi-
tivity to world knowledge violations.
Discussion
The present EEG study investigated online comprehension of
counterfactual antecedents and the role of pragmatic skills
therein. This yielded two novel findings. First, we observed
that a subtle difference in linguistic mood (If sweets were/are
made out of sugar, with subjunctive and indicative mood for
counterfactuals and hypotheticals, respectively) was associat-
edwith a robust N400 ERP difference. The critical word sugar
elicited larger N400s following the counterfactual were com-
pared to the hypothetical are. We take this result to reflect the
lower expectancy for the word sugar in the counterfactual
antecedent compared to in the hypothetical antecedent.
Second, this pragmatic-counterfactual N400-effect increased
with the pragmatic abilities of the participant. This suggests
that pragmatic ability—the knowledge of the communicative
and social use of language and successful application of this
knowledge in daily life—is associated with better online use
of the counterfactual-pragmatic cue conveyed by subjunctive
mood. Thus, we take our results to reflect the real-time prag-
matic processes involved in creating counterfactual worlds.
In addition to these key findings, we observed larger N400s
overall when the critical word had little semantic relationship
to the context and conveyed information that was false with
respect to world knowledge (If words were/are made out of
sugar). In these sentences, the ERP responses are primarily
driven by lack of contextual facilitation. Absence of a linguis-
tic mood effect here is in line with previous studies that re-
ported absence of a negation effect in sentences such as A
robin is/is not a tree (e.g., Fischler, Bloom, Childers,
Roucos, & Perry, 1983). If negation or counterfactuality does
not increase the expectation of the critical word, little effect of
truth-value is observed on the N400 (see Nieuwland, 2015,
2016, for a discussion). This is because the N400 does not
index the plausibility of the overall proposition, nor does it
reflect online verification processes directly, but the extent to
which semantic retrieval for incoming words is facilitated by
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representations of the context, whether the context is counter-
factual, hypothetical, or factual.
Individual differences in online pragmatic comprehension
Our results provide novel experimental evidence for a link be-
tween social cognition and the online processing of counterfac-
tual language. Recent results show that people can use their
pragmatic knowledge of what constitutes a contextually relevant
utterance in a rapid and incremental manner (e.g., Ferguson &
Cane, 2015; Nieuwland et al., 2010; Nieuwland & Kuperberg,
2008). This pragmatic knowledge can be used along with the
overt language input to generate coarse-grained expectancies
about what upcoming information is likely to be encountered.
However, individuals may differ greatly in their ability to gen-
erate such pragmatic expectancies (Ferguson et al., 2015;
Nieuwland et al., 2010). A pattern somewhat similar to the
current findings was observed by Nieuwland et al. (2010),
namely that pragmatically infelicitous scalar quantifier
sentences, such as Some people have lungs, elicited larger
N400s than felicitous sentences, such as Some people have pets,
only in individuals with relatively good pragmatic skills (low
AQ-Comm scores). Related findings have also been reported for
individual differences in empathy, the ability to recognize and
experience the emotions of others (Ferguson et al., 2015; Van
den Brink et al., 2012). For example, high-empathy individuals
showed greater N400-effects of speaker-message incongruence
(an adult saying BI cannot sleep without my teddy^ compared to
a child saying this; Van den Brink et al., 2012).
Findings from the empathy quotient and autism question-
naire may be quite similar. Scores on these questionnaires are
strongly correlated and are both employed in the diagnosis of
autism spectrum disorder, perhaps because both tap into dif-
ferent aspects of misunderstanding other’s intentions (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001;
Wheelwright et al., 2006). The inclusion of such measures is
reflecting a growing interest to incorporate individual differ-
ences in online language processing. It also highlights the
increasing acceptance of the view that nonlinguistic processes
such as pragmatic inferencing, social stereotyping, or belief
computation play an important role during online language
processing (Ferguson et al., 2015; Van den Brink et al.,
2012). Our results directly support this development by con-
tributing evidence that pragmatic skills play a role in online
counterfactual sentence comprehension.
Counterfactual language and autism
Our results have potential implications for the understanding
of counterfactual reasoning deficits in autism. Participants
Fig. 3 ERP results of declarative control clauses. Left side: Grand average
waveforms time-locked to critical word onset. Right side middle: Scalp
distributions of the mean difference effect of truth-value. Right side
bottom: Correlation of the Autism Questionnaire Communication score
(AQ-Comm) with the voltage difference between true and false conditions
over right hemisphere electrodes. (Color figure online)
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with autism are known to pay less attention to contextual cues
during reasoning (De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, &
Dolan, 2008). For example, autists make less use of their
world knowledge in conditional reasoning tasks. This lowers
their susceptibility to counterexamples to conditional rela-
tions, whereas control participants perform less Blogical^ be-
cause of plausibility and reality bias (McKenzie et al., 2010;
Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009).
Autists also have difficulties using discourse or sentence con-
text to disambiguate semantically ambiguous words (F.
Happé, 1997). These results have been attributed to weak
central coherence—the deficient employment of world
knowledge during language understanding (F. G. Happé &
Frith, 2006). Such deficit might also be related to autists’
counterfactual reasoning difficulties (Scott et al., 1999).
It should be emphasized that the present study was carried
out with healthy students who showed only a subclinical var-
iation of a subcategory of traits associated with autism.
However, our results indicate that autism-like traits have a
graded impact on basic semantic processing during language
comprehension. This finding itself seems consistent with a
central coherence explanation, namely that weaker pragmatic
skills are associated with less use of world knowledge to pre-
dict upcoming information. However, the observation that the
pragmatic correlation could not be explained by participants’
sensitivity to world knowledge violations does not support
this conclusion. Instead, our results suggest that self-reported
pragmatic skills are predictive of using pragmatic information
in an online manner during comprehension, which is qualita-
tively different form a general impairment to recruit world
knowledge.
Our results are thus in line with the assumption that it is the
pragmatic difficulty to create a possible world what underlies
autists’ counterfactual reasoning impairments. Because under-
standing other people’s communicative intentions is required
to successfully incorporate pragmatic cues during counterfac-
tual language comprehension, autists might have particular
difficulties at this early point of counterfactual interpretation.
Less sensitive to the explicit cue of counterfactuality, they are
more likely to miss the communicative intention of counter-
factuals’ pretence and subsequently revert to shallow reason-
ing strategies (Leevers & Harris, 2000).
However, further research is required to clarify the exact
relation between social-communicative abilities and counter-
factual reasoning and to overcome some of the limits of the
current study. The design of our study did not allow us to
directly investigate the relationship between the processing
of counterfactual antecedents and consequents. One important
question for further research is how counterfactual antecedent
comprehension affects the processing of subsequent conse-
quents as well as conditional reasoning performance in gener-
al. In particular, individuals with lower pragmatic skills might
still be able to establish counterfactual meaning, but this
processing step might be delayed. Another open question is
whether the current result replicate in counterfactual anteced-
ents with highly predictable critical words that are semantical-
ly related to the context (e.g., If WWII had been won by the
Nazis, or If sweets were not made out of sugar). Our results
may also be fairly specific to English, where verb-mood is
available before the critical word. This can work differently
in other languages (e.g., German; see Kulakova et al., 2014),
and studying counterfactual constructions in different lan-
guages can therefore clarify the time course of incremental
pragmatic processing as a function of the order of incoming
information. Further investigations are also required to clarify
whether the current online results indeed are best explained by
pragmatic skills, as perhaps the most important caveat to our
conclusions is that we did not investigate the possible role of
other individual differences. For instance, grammatical skills
might play an important role in identifying the counterfactual
meaning of subjunctive mood in the antecedent, given that
linguistic mood is a grammatical feature. Children with autism
who generally have problems with counterfactuals usually do
not have a grammatical impairment (Weismer et al., 2011),
suggesting that grammatical deficits are not necessary to dis-
rupt counterfactual comprehension, but grammatical deficits
(possibly independently of pragmatic skills) might indeed be
sufficient to disrupt counterfactual comprehension. Finally, a
validation of our findings with a clinically autistic sample
could further help to identify how more severe pragmatic def-
icits affect online counterfactual sentence processing.
Conclusion
Counterfactual Bwhat-if^ thought enables people to go beyond
the here and now and into hypothetical worlds they know to
be false. The present study examined the brain’s electrophys-
iological correlates of creating such possible worlds during
online language comprehension and investigated whether
social-communicative pragmatic skills predicted the online
use of counterfactual cues. Our results show that
counterfactuality, as conveyed by subjunctive mood, is quick-
ly incorporated during language comprehension and leads
comprehenders to decrease the expectations about upcoming
information they would normally base on real-world knowl-
edge. Words that are true with respect to this knowledge there-
fore incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger
N400 amplitude, in counterfactuals compared to hypotheticals
(If sweets were/are made of sugar). However, individuals who
are better at understanding the communicative intentions of
other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based ex-
pectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first dem-
onstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in
creating possible worlds.
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